|Table of Contents|

Evolutionary game of safety supervision between government and road transport enterprises based on thirdparty(PDF)

长安大学学报（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

Issue:
2021年3期
Page:
106-115
Research Field:
交通工程
Publishing date:

Info

Title:
Evolutionary game of safety supervision between government and road transport enterprises based on thirdparty
Author(s):
JIAO Ping1;  ZHANG Shuai2;  ZHAO Xiaoman3
（1. School of Economics and Management, Xian Aeronautical University, Xian 710077, Shaanxi, China;2. School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China; 3. Department of Economics,Xian Jiaotong University City College, Xian 710018, Shaanxi, China）
Keywords:
traffic engineering;  road transportation safety supervision;  evolutionary game model;  thirdparty safety supervision
PACS:
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DOI:
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Abstract:
To analyze the evolution of the behavior strategies of government and road transport enterprises under thirdparty safety supervision, and to solve the problem of insufficient safety supervision in road transport, the government supervision costs and benefits, road transport enterprises costs and profits, government rewards and penalties, the degree of violations by enterprises, and traffic accident losses of government and road transportation enterprises were regarded as the influencing factors of behavior strategies for government and road transportation enterprises. Using the theory of evolutionary game, an evolution game model of government safety supervision and safety production of road transportation enterprises considering the thirdparty safety supervision and reward and punishment mechanisms were established. The local equilibrium point between the government and road transportation enterprises was derived by employing replicated dynamic equation and Jacobian matrix method, and its stability was also analyzed. Under different parameter settings, the MATLAB software was used to simulate the longterm stable equilibrium point. At the same time, the longterm evolution law of the behavior choices of the government and road transportation enterprises was obtained under the scenario of road transport neglecting safety and safety in production. And through differential equations, the influence of reward and punishment and thirdparty safety supervision on the behavior choices of road transport enterprises were discussed. The results show that when road transport enterprises neglect the safety in production, the government has two longterm stable strategies, supervised and unsupervised. If road transport enterprises are producing safety, supervision is the only longterm stable strategy for government. The stronger the reward and punishment, the more they tend to adopt the behavior strategy of safety production, but the effect of the reward and punishment mechanism is indirectly affected by the thirdparty safety supervision agency. The thirdparty safety supervision agency can influence the probability that road transport enterprises produce safety by affecting their safety production costs, but the effect is complex. Thirdparty supervision will also reduce the amount of road accident losses of road transportation enterprises, and then makes them tend to choose to neglected safety production strategy. 〖JP2〗The stronger the supervision capacity of the thirdparty, the more illegal operations it can expose, which in turn can prompt road transport enterprises to choose safety production strategy. 2 tabs, 3 figs, 28 refs.

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Last Update: 2021-06-04